Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 28

Issue 4

Article 11

1940

Administrative Law--The Abolition of the Negative Order Doctrine
Alan R. Vogeler
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Vogeler, Alan R. (1940) "Administrative Law--The Abolition of the Negative Order Doctrine," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 28: Iss. 4, Article 11.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol28/iss4/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-THE ABOLITION
ORDER DOCTRINE

OF THE NEGATIVE

The Communication Act of 19341 provided that the Federal Communications Commission should not have jurisdiction over carriers
engaged in interstate commerce solely through physical connections
with the facilities of another carrier, unless they are under the control
of such carrier. In order to obtain knowledge of communication practices, the Commission required all telephone carriers subject to the
Act to file certain statements. Plaintiff, engaged in interstate commerce solely through physical connection with the New York Telephone Company, refused to comply on the ground that it was not under
the control of the New York Company. After a full hearing, the Commission determined that plaintiff was under New York control and
ordered it classified as subject to all telephone carrier provisions of
the 1934 Act. In the District Court, Plaintiff's appeal from this order
was dismissed on its merits, and a further appeal was made to the
Supreme Court. On the latter appeal the Commission contended that
since the order classifying Plaintiff as subject to its jurisdiction was
a "negative order", it was not subject to judicial review. The Court
abolished the doctrine of nega- (opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurtler)
tive orders and held the order subject to review, although the appeal
2
was dismissed on the merits.
The doctrine that negative orders of an administrative body are
not subject to review by the judiciary was first announced in the case
3
of Proctor & Gamble v. United States. In that case the plaintiff had
applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for an order forbidding
the carriers to continue certain demurrage charges. The plaintiff's
application was denied, and it finally appealed to the Supreme Court,
which held that such an order Was not reviewable because it was negative. The court determined that the words "any order" in the statute 4
conferring power of review to the judiciary gave the courts power to
set aside or enjoin only such orders as they might enforce. Thus the
apparent origin of the doctrine was a matter of statutory construction,
the court interpreting the words "any order" to exclude a refusal by
the administrative body to grant relief. The reason impelling the
decision, however, was a desire to achieve a proper adjustment of
governance between the administrative and judicial authority in order
147 U. S. C. A. Sec. J52 (b).
"Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754,
83 L. ed. 1147 (1939).
-225 U. S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761, 56 L. ed. 1091 (1912).
436 Stat. 1087, 1148; See. 207 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911.
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properly to carry out the purposes for which the administrative body
5
was created.
After Proctor & Gamble v. United States, numerous cases followed
6
doctrine. Mr. Justice Frankfurter classifies these
the negative order
7
follows:
as
eases
"1) Where the action sought to be reviewed may have the effect
of forbidding or compelling conduct on the part of the person
seeking to review it, but only if some further action is taken
by the Commission. ...
"2) Where the action sought to be reviewed declines to relieve the
complainant from a statutory command forbidding or compelling conduct on his part. . .9
"3) Where the action sought to be reviewed does not forbid or
compel conduct on the part of the person seeking review but
is attacked because it does not forbid or compel conduct by a
third person....xo
But even under such a classification the distinction between affirmative
n
and negative orders is a tenuous one. For example, in two cases with
similar facts, opposite decisions were reached."
5 225 U. S. 282, 294-298. Mr. Justice Frankfurter brings this out
In the Rochester case, 307 U. S. 125, 137, 59 S. Ct. 754, 760, 83 L. ed.
1147, 1156 (1939). At first glance it appears that the Rochester case,
by abolishing a doctrine which limited judicial review, widens the
extent of judicial control of administrative action. To the effect that
such control is not broadened, see infra n. 16.
6Hooker v. Knapp, 225 U. S. 302, 32 S. Ct. 769, 56 L. ed. 1099 (1912);
Lehigh Valley Ry. v. U. S., 243 U. S. 412, 37 S. Ct. 397, 61 L. ed. 819
(1917); Great Northern Ry. v. U. S., 277 U. S. 172, 48 S. Ct. 466, 72
L. ed. 838 (1928); Piedmont & N. Ry. v. U. S., 280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct.
192, 74 L. ed. 551 (1930); Standard Oil v. U. S., 283 U. S. 235, 75 L. ed.
999 (1931); U. S. v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 58 S. Ct. 601, 82 L. ed. 764
(1938); Diamond Tank Transport v. I. C. C., 23 F. Supp. 497 (D. Wash.
1938), aff'd 305 U. S. 567, 59 S. Ct. 243, 83 L. ed. 436 (1939).
307 U. S. 125, 129, 59 S. Ct. 754, 756, 83 L. ed.. 1147, 1152 (1939).
'For example, where an attempt is made to review an I. C. C.
valuation: 307 U. S. 125, 129, 59 S. Ct. 754, 756, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1152
(1939).
9For example, where the I. C. C. denies permission to depart from
the long-short haul clause; 307 U. S. 125, 129, 59 S. Ct. 754, 756, 83 L. ed.
1147, 1152 (1939).
10For example, where a shipper requests the I. C. C. to order a
carrier to adopt certain rates, which the Commission declines to do:
307 U. S. 125, 130, 59 S. Ct. 754, 757, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1152 (1939). For
a specific discussion of whether the various classes of negative orders
are correctly interpreted, and a discussion of what cases are included
in the categories, see McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal
Administrative Orders (1940), 28 Calif. L. Rev. 129, 139-143; Notes
(1939) 24 Wash. U. L. Quar. 591, (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 379.
" Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S.. 125, 140, 59 S. Ct.
754, 762, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1158 (1939).
2 Compare Pacific Power and Light Co. v. Fed. Power Com'n, 98
F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 9th 1938), aff' 307 U. S. 156, 59 S. Ct. 766,
83 L. ed. 1180 (1939), with Newport Electric Corp. v. Fbd. Power Com'n,
97 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), where on essentially similar facts
(application for a license to merge public utility after a showing of
public convenience and necessity) refusal of the Commission to grant

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
In the Proctor & Gamble case Mr. Justice White apprehended that
judicial review where the Interstate Commerce Commission had refused
to give relief would be an invasion of the administrative function, and
3
The decision,
therefore the courts should not review that refusal.
doctrinalized and mechanically followed, ignores the fact that where
a negative order of the administrative agency substantially affects
rights, judicial review of such order is no more an invasion of the
14
administrative power than where the order is affirmative in form.
The negative order doctrine, evolved to effectuate the board considerations compelling independent administrative judgment, has tortured those considerations into a technical matter of form which no
longer is concerned with the proper distribution of governmental
power between the judiciary and administrative bodies, but merely
with the language in which the administrative agency's order has
been couched." Because of this, the doctrine is better done away with
if the courts are able, without it, consciously to achieve the results
6
A proper coordination of administrative and
originally desired.
judicial activity can be attained by the doctrines which Mr. Justice
7
Frankfurter in the principal case terms "primary jurisdiction"' and
%
"administrative finality".'
a license was held in the first case reviewable as an affirmative order,
and in the second, non-reviewable as negative. Commented upon at
(1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 522 (written while Mr. Justice Frankfurter
was professor of administrative law at Harvard, and suggesting the
negative order doctrine be abolished as unnecessary. The note points
out that the doctrine is a matter of form rather than substance. In
the Rochester case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter explains that the doctrine
is merely a matter of form. 307 U. S. 125, 142, 59 S. Ct. 754, 763, 83
I. ed. 1147, 1159 (1939).
1 Proctor and Gamble v. U. S., supra n. 4.
11See to that effect: Notes (1938) 47 Yale L. Jour. 766, 787, (1939)
52 Harvard L. Rev. 522.
lpra n. 12.
That theories of "administrative finality" and "primary jurisdiction" as used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter will achieve the same results,
see: Notes (1938) 51 Harvard L. Rev. 1251 (1939) 18 Chicago-Kent
L. Rev. 74, 89, (1939) 52 Harvard L. Rev. 522, (1939) 25 Virginia L.
Rev. 981, (1939) 24 Wash. U. L. Quar. 591, 594-595, (1940) 28 Calif.
L. Rev. 129, (1940) 24 Minn. 379, 384. Mr. Justice Frankfurter so states
in the principal case, 307 U. S. 125, 140, 59 S. Ct. 754, 763, 83 L. ed. 1147,
1158 (1939). But see Notes (1939) 53 Harvard L. Rev. 98, (1940) 15
Indiana L. Jour. 151.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter means a
27 By "primary jurisdiction"
recognition by the courts of administrative competence to decide technical matters which the statutes allocate to administrative agencies.
307 U. S. 125, 139, 59 S. Ct. 754, 761, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1157 (1939). And
see Note (1938) 51 Harvard L. Rev. 1251. Thus where a shipper sues
a carrier to recover charges allegedly in excess of a reasonable rate,
which charges had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, the shipper must first apply for relief to the Commission, and
can not resort to the courts in the first instance. Texas & Pacific Ry.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. ed. 553
(1907); I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. Ry., 227' U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185,
187, 57 L. ed. 431 (1913). For further discussion of "primary jurisdic-
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Mr. Justice Butler, concurring in the result in the instant case,
complains that this does not seem to be the proper occasion for
"
abolishing the negative order doctrine. Whether or not this is so, the
doctrine has rightly been repudiated.
Anw R. VoGorm
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
DETERMINATION AS TO FACT
The state constitution' authorized the general assembly to establish new judicial districts "having due regard to territory, business,
and population." A new district was established by the legislature
and suit was brought to enjoin the newly appointed judge thereof from
discharging any of the duties of his office, on the ground that the general assembly failed to exercise due regard for territory, business, and
population. Defendant demurred to the petition, alleging that the
court had no authority to review the legislative finding as to those
facts. The demurrer was overruled on the basis that it was the duty
of the court to determine whether the actual facts justified the creation of the new district. Willis v. Jonson, 275 Ky. 538, 121 S. W. (2d)
2
904 (1938).
The Kentucky court apparently decides whether or not it will
review the legislative determination of fact, by investigating whether
or not the act was passed in pursuance of an express authority or duty
granted or placed upon the General Assembly by the Kentucky Constitution. If the legislature has power to act only in certain con3
tingencies, the court will look to see if such contingency exists; but
tion", see McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, (1940) 28 Calif L. Rev. 129, 143-150; Note (1939) 18
Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 74, 79 et seq.
' By "administrative finality" Mr. Justice Frankfurter means that
findings of fact of an administrative agency will be conclusive as to
such facts. 307 U. S. 125, 142, 59 S. Ct. 754, 763, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1159
(1939). Thus, where the Interstate Commerce Commission determines
that a reshipping privilege granted by a carrier is an undue preference
not allowed by law, the court has no power to disturb that finding.
U. S. v. Louisville & N. fy., 235 U. S. 314, 35 S. Ct. 113, 59 L. ed. 245
(1914). Accord: L C. C. v. Illinois C. Ry., 215 U. S.. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155,
54 L. ed. 280 (1909); I. C. C. v. Union P. fy., 222 U. S. 451, 32 S. Ct.
108, 56 L. ed. 308 (1911). For further discussion of "administrative
finality" see McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, (1940) 28 Calif. L. Rev. 129; Note (1939) 13 ChicagoKent L. Rev. 74.
1'Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125, 146, 59 S. Ct.
754, 765, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1161 (1939).
Ky. Const., Sects. 128 and 132.
2On a second appeal the court reviewed the evidence upon which
the Legislature acted, and finding that it did not contradict the constitutional provision, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Willis
279 Ky. 416, 130 S. W. (2d) 828 (1939).
v. Jonson,
3
Zimmerman v. Brooks, 118 Ky. 85, 80 S. W. 443 (1904); Ragland
v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S. W. 865 (1907); Scott v. McCreary,
148 Ky. 791, 147 S. W. 903 (1912); Nolan v. Jones, 215 Ky. 2&8, 184
S. W. 1054 (1926).

